A New Stoicism
Lawrence C. Becker
1999 Princeton: Princeton University Press.
pp. viii + 216. ISBN: 0-691-00964-3 (pb). £10.50.
Practical Philosophy (Book Reviews) July 2001 Volume 4.2
Reviewed by: Trevor Curnow
There has been a considerable revival of interest in Stoicism in recent decades, and this has manifested itself in a number of ways. With regard to primary texts, a number of new translations have appeared, not just of old favourites but of more obscure works too. In the area of secondary literature, some have concentrated their efforts on rediscovering what it meant to be a Stoic in antiquity, and on the methods the school used to train its adherents. Others have looked at the therapeutic uses of Stoic teachings in contemporary life. A New Stoicism self-consciously and determinedly sets out to offer something different from any of these types of work.
Becker is guided throughout his book by the question as to what Stoicism would look like today if it had continued as an unbroken tradition since antiquity. He rightly takes it as a given that it would have undergone significant changes. It had already shown a propensity for shifting its positions during the period when it did constitute an unbroken tradition. The long-standing custom of distinguishing between the early, middle and late Stoas is a reflection of this fact, since the labels are intended to indicate far more than the simple passage of time. Nevertheless, the very fact of unbroken tradition meant that it was both possible and relatively easy to accept them all as different versions of one and the same philosophy. On the other hand, one of the challenges facing Becker is that of justifying the claim that what he puts forward should be seen as a form of Stoicism, rather than something else.
In order to meet this challenge, he is obliged to confront the fundamental question of what is essential to Stoicism. Surprisingly, perhaps, the most famous principle of classical Stoicism, ‘Live in accordance with nature!’ is not regarded as essential at all. Becker’s reasoning is that the principle was founded upon a teleological view of nature which is no longer sustainable. And it is no longer sustainable because it is not in accordance with contemporary scientific opinion. For Becker, ‘follow nature’ is to be replaced by ‘follow the facts’, and science is to be taken an authoritative arbiter of what ‘the facts’ are. On the other hand, ‘science’ is broadly construed so as to encompass the social sciences as well as the natural ones, and he makes considerable use of the findings of psychology in particular.
What he does regard as essential can be summarised by saying that he regards Stoicism as a eudaimonistic, naturalistic, rational philosophy, that espouses the unity of virtue. That is to say, Stoicism holds that the way to a good life (which is both fulfilling and virtuous) is through the exercise of practical reason upon our knowledge of the world (which includes our knowledge of ourselves). Stoicism shows us how to have the best life possible, given that we are material, rational agents. The bulk of the book is dedicated to unpacking, explaining and justifying this basic outlook. The case is densely argued, and it is impossible to do full justice to it here. Consequently, applying his ‘axiom of futility’, I will not try to. However, potential readers should be aware that the text is distinctly heavy going in parts, made even more so by what seem to be some eccentricities of usage.
Fortunately, given the amount of material and the number of ideas Becker manages to fit into his argument, even those who violently disagree with it (or fail to understand it!) may find the book worthwhile. Each chapter ends with a commentary section in which he discusses a range of primary and secondary materials. Collectively they provide a useful resource for the student of Stoicism. He also offers some interesting observations concerning the nature of ethics. His suggestion that it deals with ‘all things considered’ judgements is a useful corrective to the tendency in much of modern moral philosophy to limit its scope. In a similar vein, he notes that Stoicism, properly understood, is concerned with whole lives, and it is for this reason that he takes a dim view of some of the narrow therapeutic purposes to which some contemporary writers have sought to put it.
This book is not designed to be an introduction to Stoicism, and should not be approached as such. Better alternatives are available, and his treatment of some of the traditional problem areas of Stoicism, such as determinism and apatheia, are amongst the least helpful and least persuasive parts of what he has to say. With regard to apatheia in particular, it may be questioned whether his revisionist approach leaves him with something which is still entitled to be called Stoicism. However, as an invitation and stimulus to thinking through what Stoicism may still have to offer to the modern world, it is a useful volume.
