Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation
Richard Sorabji
2000 Oxford: OUP
ISBN 0-19-825005-3 (hb) £30.00
Practical Philosophy (Book Reviews) July 2001 Volume 4.2
Reviewed by: Tim LeBon
'For two days' labour, you ask two hundred guineas?' 'No, I ask it for the knowledge of a lifetime'. Such was the famous reply given by the nineteenth century artist James McNeil Whistler to what seemed to him like a rather impertinent question. The reader of Emotion and Peace of Mind is asked to pay a good deal less than two hundred guineas; the book is the product of the knowledge of a lifetime and also, one can be certain, substantially more than two days labour. Sorabji has taken on – and pulled off - the monumental task of surveying and evaluating philosophical thought about the emotions from the early Stoics to St. Augustine. What is more – and what makes the book a key work for the practical philosopher – the book is not just exegesis and comment about theory; it also grapples with the question of how and when the Stoics (in particular) might help one to cope with one's emotions and establish peace of mind in practice.
This is by no means the first book to suggest that the ancients may have a thing or two to teach us about how to live. Both Martha Nussbaum's The Therapy of Desire and Pierre Hadot's Philosophy as a Way of Life are established classics in the field. But Sorabji provides by far the most convincing argument for seeing the Stoics, specifically, as relevant today ; the focus of the other books is Hellenistic philosophy in general. He achieves this not only by providing a detailed, scholarly and, in the main, lucid account of Stoic theories – he also adds a twist to it that will make it much more palatable to most modern readers. It is normally argued that Stoicism makes sense only within their whole world view; their theory of emotions, then, would make sense only in the light of their views about virtue being the only good. This traditional view is well summed up by Keith Seddon 'Stoic theory held that the only good thing is virtue … and the only bad thing is vice, its opposite. Everything else is ‘indifferent’….For the Stoics, then, all passion is inappropriate because having any passion can occur only in the circumstance that the agent has an attachment to something that can be only properly preferred or dispreferred'. (Seddon, 2000). The problem is that many (including the current writer) find the Stoic view about virtue and indifference unattractive. So should we consign hundreds of years of philosophical thought and practice to the rubbish heap? According to Richard Sorabji, we should not. Sorabji explores what is left of Stoic ideas about the emotions, once we discard the theory of indifference, and concludes that there is much of value. The Stoic who is central to Sorabji's argument is Chrysippus, third head of the Stoa and author of over 700 works, none of which have survived. Whilst believing in the theory of indifference himself, Chrysippus put forward a version of the Stoic theory of emotions which is general enough to be useful to those who do not. Like most Stoics, Chrysippus held that emotions were judgements; Chrysippus went further and identified two judgements that constitute every emotion:- "One is that there is good or bad (benefit or harm) at hand, the other that it is appropriate to react'. (Sorabji, p 29). Suppose you break a Ming vase. The Stoic would be dispassionate –the vase is a preferred indifferent. Sorabji's neo-Stoic, who believes that emotions are judgements but does not believe in indifference, however, might well judge that bad was at hand when the vase was broken – G.E. Moore, for example would lament that there was less beauty in the world. But before we get angry we need to ask – would it be appropriate to react angrily ? Since such a reaction might actually worsen the harm done, such a question is a powerful way of challenging harmful emotions without appeal to Stoic ideas about virtue and indifference.
Having drawn our attention early on to the universal appeal of this (neo) Stoic view, Sorabji proceeds by providing a scholarly survey of ideas about emotions from Zeno onwards, focussing mainly on Chrysippus and Seneca but also discussing objections and alternative accounts from Plato, Aristotle, Galen and Epicureans. Sorabji makes the Stoic theory that emotions are just judgements more plausible by distinguishing real emotions from both 'first movements' (involuntary precursors of real emotion, such as trembling) and 'third movements' (where one gets carried away by an emotion – for example you let your verbal anger get translated into physical anger). There is also a very interesting chapter on the implications of modern brain research, especially the works of Joseph LeDoux, and how they might be best accommodated by the Stoic. The later chapters go on to cover such topics as the seven cardinal sins and Augustine on Lust and the Will in a much more cursory fashion.
What is most distinctive about the book is its combination of scholarship and practical philosophy. Sorabji is a philosopher with complete mastery of the original sources, always ready to offer his own interpretations of the original text. This does mean that the book can be heavy going in places – not because it lacks clarity, but because Sorabji aims to do justice to the minutiae of varying interpretations. Yet some chapters would not be out of place in a book of purely practical philosophy – particularly Chapters 15 'How the Ancient Exercises Work' and 16 'Exercises Concerned with Time and Self'. Moreover, the Introduction supplies a lucid and relatively non-technical account of the main ideas contained in the book and could well be recommended to philosophical counselling students or clients.
As you will gather, I recommend this book very highly to all interested in rigorous practical philosophy, but I do have a couple of minor criticisms. First, much more could be said about Stoicism's connection with modern cognitive therapy. Sorabji has a few pages on this (pp. 153-4), rightly pointing out that cognitive therapy differs from Stoicism in that it focuses mainly on factual rather than evaluative errors (p154). But it would have been interesting for him to have said something about REBT, a form of cognitive therapy which, like Stoicism, focuses more on evaluative mistakes, only with a hedonistic rather than a virtue-based value system. There is also certainly room for more, much more, to be said about the synthesis of various forms of modern cognitive therapy and Stoicism. This comment should perhaps best be taken not so much as a criticism of Sorabji's book (it's a book about ancient philosophy, not modern cognitive therapy) as a plea for another writer to carry out such a task. My second criticism is that although Sorabji is enthusiastic about the potential for Stoic therapy, he concedes quite a lot, too much in my view, to its opponents. For example on page 212 Sorabji states '"I agree with a good point made by Bernard Williams, that it [Stoic Therapy] could not deal with the problems that psychoanalysis sets out to tackle.' He further suggests that Stoic therapy is suitable only for dealing with situations - like failing to gain promotion and having missed a plane (Sorabji's examples) but not for more general depression or anxiety. Leaving aside questions about whether psychoanalysis really can deliver its promises, I think Sorabji is wrong to limit Stoic therapy in this way. Modern cognitive therapists argue that CBT and REBT are not just useful for helping with difficult situations; they can also help with mood-related disorders, such as depression and anxiety, which can be tackled by sufferers becoming more aware of and then challenging the negative automatic thoughts and core beliefs that underlie them. I see no reason my Stoic therapy could not equally be extended to tackle mood-related disorders.
To conclude, I heartily recommend this book to all practical philosophers. To philosophical counsellors, it offers not only a resource, but also a reminder that therapy should not be treated as a taboo word. To cognitive psychotherapists, if offers the wisdom of several hundred of Stoic practice to supplement their forty or so years of therapeutic practice. To all of us if offers stimulating insights about the emotions and how to cope with them.
References
Hadot, P (1995) Philosophy as a Way of Life Oxford: Blackwell
Nussbaum. M.C. (1984) The Therapy of Desire Princeton: Princeton University Press
Seddon, K (2000) The Stoics on why we should strive to be free of the passions, Practical Philosophy, 3:3 pp. 6-11.
