Issues in Philosophical Counselling

Peter Raabe

Westport: Praeger, 2002.
ISBN 027597667X (hb), pp. 248, £54.50

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Practical Philosophy  (Book Reviews) Spring 2003 Volume 6.1

Reviewed by: Karin Murris

Raabe’s Issues in Philosophical Counselling is a sequel to his beginner’s guide Philosophical Counselling: Theory and Practice and a useful addition to the rapidly growing support now available for philosophers who would like to practise philosophy in therapeutic settings.

 

However, considering that this book is written for academic philosophers, philosophical counsellors and non-philosophers, his choice of opening chapter is unfortunate. He condemns academic philosophy as being ‘arid’, busy with ‘trivial abstract analysis’ and ‘almost exclusively hypothetical’. Reading the opening sentence - ‘If it weren’t for philosophical counselling, the ancient conception of philosophy as something that is put into practice by philosophers would now be completely meaningless’ - might not only prevent a constructive dialogue with academic philosophers, but also with practical philosophers involved in the much earlier established practices of Philosophy with Children and Socratic Dialogue (in the Leonard Nelson tradition). Raabe’s claim is not only psychologically a bad choice - as feeling defensive about the legitimacy of one’s own occupation inhibits openness for new ideas - but it is also false. There are numerous counterexamples, but just to mention one, as early as 1930, Bertrand Russell explains the aim of his insightful book The Conquest of Happiness  as follows: ‘I venture to hope that some among those multitudes of men and women who suffer unhappiness without enjoying it, may find their situation diagnosed and a method of escape suggested.’

 

Not only would applied philosophers such as Peter Singer be unable live up to Raabe’s prescriptive conception of philosophy, but even Socrates himself (who practised courage when drinking the hemlock, not just talked about abstract virtues) apparently failed miserably when taking his own life. He should have saved his own life, as ‘the one thing that is always infinitely more important than any abstract theoretical principles…’ Not all philosophers would go along with ‘improving the human condition’ as a necessary condition for genuine philosophical practice. Is it really true that all philosophers should use their skills to help others ‘deal with the problems of their lives in any meaningful way’ and even if this were true, does the abstract ‘meaningless shuffling of symbols’ necessarily prevent philosophers from doing so (not according to first philosophical counsellor Gerd Achenbach!)?

 

However, despite many sweeping generalisations about philosophy, Issues in Philosophical Counselling does have a lot to offer. In common with other philosophical counsellors (and many other counsellors and psychotherapists) he argues that medication can interfere with people’s motivation to think through their own problems. Although philosophical counselling is not therapy, dialoguing with a philosopher may be therapeutic. The philosopher’s understanding of different theoretical perspectives and her skill in drawing out implications and assumptions are central to the process - a process that could also enrich the practice of other counsellors and psychotherapists.

 

Initially, Raabe sets out clear boundaries for the ‘experimental philosopher’. When what he calls mental illness is caused by external factors, such as stress, child abuse or other traumatic experiences, the neural ‘disturbances’ can be helped with a combination of medication and counselling; on the other hand, when caused by internal factors, such as disease, injury, toxins or drugs, only medication will help. The most obvious clients for philosophical counselling are those distressed or confused as a result of everyday unresolved problems. They are capable of ‘rational discussions’. But after illustrating his views with a case study, he does cast doubt on the necessity of medication in any case with the help of an analogy (from Gadamer): it would be wrong to assume that we take away the cause of physical pain when taking an aspirin, so similarly when taking a psychoactive drug the reason for that pain is not eliminated either. Apart from mentioning the dangers of side-effects and addiction, Raabe also puts the discussion into a socio-political and moral context by questioning what the concept ‘normal’ means.  Often individuals are treated as being ‘abnormal’ to help maintain a particular social order (e.g. children with ADHD in schools). The ‘normality’ of these social structures is not questioned.

 

For the novice, practical and encouraging advice is given on how to set up a practice and how to keep flourishing under the pressure (a regular reading of his chapter on humour should be part of that!). There are some very useful discussions about topics (homosexuality, suicide, meaning of life, religion, getting older) and issues arising in and from practice. Raabe skilfully opens up the advantages and possible problems associated with email counselling and philosophy café. How dreams could be used philosophically as ‘metaphorical road signs’ makes useful practical reading.

 

In another chapter, partly drawing on psychologist Carol Gilligan’s work, he makes elaborate connections between the typical communicative styles and behaviour of the different genders, the role of the counsellor and the counselling process. Rejecting a biological root of gender differences, he suggests - in non-judgmental terms - that it is worth being aware of those differences and working with them. A related discussion follows about the rationality of the emotions and the need to analyse the emotions in a wider (also empathetic) context. For a fuller explanation of his hermeneutical approach he refers to his previous book.

 

It is unfortunate that after reading the first chapter, academic philosophers might be very tempted to put this otherwise excellent book down. The depth of Raabe’s reflections on practice could help academic philosophers to appreciate the complexity and subtlety of the profession of a philosophical counsellor, but there are also other ways of practising philosophy. Only when we think ‘outside of boxes’  - e.g. ‘academic’ v. ‘practical’ - can we start to think constructively about how different practices can and should inform and support each other.

 

 

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