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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
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The Foundations of Socratic Ethics
Alfonso Gómez-Lobo
2001 Indianapolis: Hackett,
pp. 149ISBN: 0-87220-236-4 (pb) £9.95
Practical Philosophy (Book Reviews) Autumn 2002 Volume 4.2
Reviewed by: Trevor Curnow
This book has two principal aims, which it tackles concurrently. First, it sets out to articulate a distinctive and coherent approach to ethics. Secondly, it seeks to argue that this was the approach taken by Socrates himself. It may simplify matters to refer to the general approach to ethics under discussion as ‘socratic’, reserving ‘Socratic’ for occasions when explicit reference is made to the historical individual. Using the terms in this way, the two separate projects may (I hope) be discussed without unnecessary confusion.
The central practical issue with which Gómez-Lobo concerns himself is why Socrates chose to accept his death sentence, and made no effort to save his life once it had been passed. On the face of it, escape could have been justified in any number of ways yet, as far as we know, Socrates rejected all of them. The choice of death over life is clearly no trivial matter, and might appear perversely dogmatic when made by one traditionally celebrated for his professions of ignorance.
In reconstructing the reasons why he believes Socrates insisted on accepting his judicial fate, Gómez-Lobo identifies two principles which he takes to be the foundations of socratic ethics. First, ‘A choice is rational if and only if it is a choice of what is best for the agent’ (p. 7). Secondly, ‘Something is good for an agent if and only if it is morally right’ (p. 69). His primary resources for developing his position are Plato’s Apology, Crito and Gorgias, with passing references to Euthyphro and Euthydemus. As it evolves, a strong resemblance between socratic ethics and Stoicism appears, with a radical opposition of virtue and vice, and a minimal importance attached to non-moral goods. On the other hand, the importance attached to the traditional virtue of sophrosyne also evokes echoes of Aristotle. In the end it is argued that the life of virtue is commended by self-interest, and is therefore prudentially rather than deontologically or teleogically based. However, because the virtues (especially justice) are other-regarding, such a position is distinguished from egoism. And because the virtues, rather than pleasure, are regarded as constitutive of happiness, it is also distinguished from hedonism.
As will be evident from the above, Gómez-Lobo treads territory very familiar to anyone with a knowledge of ancient Greek ethics. I think he does succeed in constructing a coherent (although not necessarily persuasive) socratic ethics which does help in understanding how Socrates might have made his fateful position. There are also interesting discussions of the problem of Socratic irony and the extent to which Socrates really disclaimed knowledge, and these have value independent of the uses to which they are put here. Yet, when all the pieces are put together there can be no guarantee that what emerges is the authentic Socratic ethics. There are simply too many unknowns, too many imponderables. Nevertheless, the socratic ethics Gómez-Lobo produces has an indisputably noble tone and touches base with all the obvious ingredients. Whether or not it is not the real thing, it has much to commend it.
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