 |
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
|
|
|
PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
|
Philosophical Practice
Lou Marinoff
2002 New York: Academic Press.
pp. 411 ISBN 0124715559 (hb) $69.95
Practical Philosophy (Book Reviews) Spring 2002 Volume 4.2
Reviewed by: Peter B. Raabe
Despite what the title may seem to suggest, this is not a ‘how to’ book on method in philosophical practice. It does not offer to help improve the personal techniques of philosophical practitioners. According to its author, ‘the purpose of this book is to describe the field as it currently stands’ (p. xix). I would like to strongly emphasize that this book is indeed a collection of one man’s personal assertions concerning the technical and political aspects of the profession or ‘institution’.
The book is divided into five parts and seventeen chapters dealing with topics such as the professionalization, marketing, and politics of philosophical practice. It begins with discussions about the nature of philosophy and its relationship to counselling and corporate consulting. There is generally nothing new in the first seven chapters since this material can be found in many other sources. But Marinoff comes to some very puzzling conclusions, such as, for example, that opportunities in organizational consulting represent ‘the summit of philosophical practice’, and that ‘unlike politicians, corporations need philosophical guidance, and more-over know they need it’ (pp. 170-171). What is one to make of this? And what is one to make of his claim that ‘Intolerant anti-realists, in the various garbs of feminism, ethnocentrism, neo-Marxism, postmodernism, deconstructionism, social constructivism, and the like, which first debased standards and next destroyed curricula, then set their aberrant sights on the sciences themselves – but proved unequal to the task of toppling reliable knowledge and method with predictable inanity and cupidity – ironically helped prepare the ground for philosophical practice’ (p. 44)?
From its very beginning to its very end this book is filled with numerous bewildering passages. For example, concerning the elimination of religious studies classes in public schools he writes: ‘[they have been replaced by] mandatory and vindictive propagandizations that attempt to normalize moral relativism, social depravity, and sexual aberration’ (p. 5); concerning psychologists: ‘The surest and quickest way to eliminate bogus ‘diseases’ would be to eliminate those who reify them’ (p. 7); concerning what makes philosophy special as a discipline: ‘There is philosophy of biology but no biology of philosophy’ (p. 31); concerning education: ‘alone in the humanities and social sciences wing of the academy, philosophy majors are obliged to read, write, and reason’ (p. 45); and again concerning psychologists: ‘A conspicuous group activity in which psychologists currently engage is orgiastic grief-counselling, wherein planeloads of grief counsellors stand by, along with Red Cross blood transfusions, to be flown to the site of the next high-school massacre, where they can roll up their sleeves and prolong everyone’s agony’ (p. 329). I am deeply concerned that with these and many other like-minded passages Marinoff has only succeeded in giving the detractors of philosophical practice more material to work with. Furthermore, Marinoff’s impassioned criticisms of academic philosophy throughout the book absolutely astound me given his vehement public denunciation of surprisingly similar criticisms I had made in a paper I presented at a conference in May, 2000.
Be that as it may, this book actually delivers what it promises – one man’s view of what the institution of philosophical practice is and ought to be. But while it is an insight into the author’s administrative acumen and organizational skills it is at the same time a very troubling publication because of what else it reveals to the reader. By this I mean that there are many passages in which the author offers what seem at first glance to be general scholarly criticisms which in fact turn out to be both explicit and implicit personal attacks (see for example page 36 footnote 18, and pages 294 and 344).
True, there is practical advice on how a philosopher might promote his or her fledgling practice, or approach a bookstore owner to start a philosophers’ café, but anyone hungering for words of wisdom about method in philosophical practice from one of the most famous pioneers in the field will find this book disappointing. Marinoff not only seems to have many personal axes to grind but he ends up using what could have been an inspiring work as his private soapbox. For example in the final chapter he extols the success of his first book, exposes the details of his political wranglings with a former academic employer, and applauds his own participation in the 2001 World Economic Forum. But none of this should be unexpected. After all, Marinoff warns his readers at the outset, ‘If you dislike polemicism, stop reading now. I evidently have some natural talent for it, which I have taken few pains to suppress’ (p. xxiii).
|
|
|