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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
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Decent People
Norman S. Care
2000 Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield,
pp. xv + 199.ISBN: 0-7425-0709-2 (pb) £14.95
Practical Philosophy (Book Reviews) Autumn 2002 Volume 4.2
Reviewed by: Trevor Curnow
The ‘decent people’ of Norman S. Care’s title are ‘morally good persons’, and this book is principally about what makes them tick. As he puts it, he is ‘interested not so much in the principles of morality as in the motivation we have for paying attention to them’ (p. 131). One of his starting points, to which he returns near the end, is the fact that neither the passive possession nor the active endorsement of moral principles is enough to ensure that we act in accordance with them. While this might have led him into a re-working of the traditional Aristotelian subject of weakness of will, he in fact takes a significantly different approach. For Care, the occasions when we do follow our moral principles are as much in need of explanation as those when we do not.
As he explains in his preface (p. xiii), the book’s chapters may be thought of as ‘studies that are reasonably complete as essays but also connected to one another.’ The result is a series of reflections on the topic from different angles and with different problems in mind. In rough and ready terms, these reflections fall naturally into two groups, the first dealing with care for oneself, the second dealing with care for others (although that is not how he describes them).
The topic of care for oneself is located within the parameters established by two fundamental forces; the will to live and the desire for peace of mind. If one has no will to live, then the question of how to live excites no interest. But if that will is present, then it is natural to seek a life offering psychological comfort, and that comfort has a moral dimension. Care’s reflections in this area lead him to consider such topics as self-respect and forgiveness as well as ‘moralised suffering’.
However, he argues that care for oneself cannot be separated from care for others. Other people, including those we have never met and those yet to be born, have claims on us. They are sources of ‘pressure-generating facts’ with which we have to deal and which may demand sacrifices. This idea is articulated in terms of a conception of personal responsibility Care calls ‘shared-fate individualism’ which issues in a call to ‘service for others’. The point of this service is ‘to position others to self-realise’ (p. 90, italics in original). Curiously, perhaps, he goes on to discuss how artists can make specific contributions to this project. It might have been more appropriate to consider the role philosophers may play, whether in writing, teaching, or counselling. Indeed, there is much in the book from which philosophical counsellors might benefit and with which, I suspect, many would agree.
Care’s overall message is that we should not be too easy on ourselves, but not too hard on ourselves either. If it is incumbent upon us to be decent people, we are not expected to be saints. ‘Perhaps taking morality seriously .. reaches a sort of internal limit or boundary. We have the moral nature we do. It equips us to take morality seriously. But it is not competent to sustain that seriousness’ (p. 146). From time to time indifference kicks in. Beyond that, we have our own individual limitations which constrain us. It is a distinctive feature of this engaging book that it contrives to be both unsettling and comforting at the same time.
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