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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
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Ethics in the Confucian Tradition (second edition)
Philip J. Ivanhoe
2002 Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002.
pp. xvii + 243 ISBN: 0-87220-597-5 (pb) £9.95
Practical Philosophy (Book Reviews) Autumn 2002 Volume 4.2
Reviewed by: Trevor Curnow
While the title of the book may suggest that it has a very broad sweep, its subtitle ‘The Thought of Mengzi and Wang Yangming’ gives a clearer indication of its scope. While there are certainly observations concerning the Confucian tradition in general, the overwhelming emphasis is on these two particular thinkers, separated in time by nearly 1800 years. Mengzi was probably born in 391 BC, while Wang definitely died in 1529 AD. Part of Ivanhoe’s argument is that while there is a recognisable continuity of concern between the two, the approaches they take are (unsurprisingly) significantly different. Many of these differences he attributes to the long influence of Buddhism on Chinese thought during the period between them. He also claims that Confucian moral philosophy in general is best understood as a form of what would now be termed virtue ethics.
The individual chapter headings give a good indication of how Ivanhoe construes the concerns of Confucian ethics: The Nature of Morality, Human Nature, The Nature and Origin of Wickedness, Self Cultivation, and Sagehood. In each of these he considers the two philosophers in turn, first the early and orthodox Mengzi, then the late and radical Wang. One theme emerges over and over again. Mengzi and Wang take fundamentally different approaches to the central issue of human nature. Both are optimists, in that they are convinced of the human potential for virtue. However, the reasons they have for optimism are not the same at all. Mengzi takes a psychological approach, and has a strong belief in the presence of sound moral sentiments in each person, which can (and need to) be developed in order to produce a virtuous character. Wang’s position is more metaphysically informed. For him, there is an already existent virtuous character in each person, but it becomes obscured, partly through the coarsening influence of the physical body, partly through the distortions of desire. The moral imperative is therefore to achieve conscious awareness of it.
While, therefore, both philosophers believe in the value of self-cultivation, they have different views on what it means and how it is to be brought about. Ivanhoe characterises these as the development and discovery models. Apart from their different grounds, perhaps the most striking contrast is in terms of how they treat emotion. For Mengzi, feelings of sympathy or shame (for example) are to be seized on as symptomatic of human goodness, and built upon in an expansive way. For Wang, there is a distrust of this dimension of life altogether as it interferes with a proper appreciation of the nature of reality. As Confucians, there is also a disparity between the two concerning their treatment of tradition. While not as conservative as Kongzi himself, Mengzi has a great respect for classical texts. Wang, on the other hand, believes each individual to possess all necessary moral knowledge (however well it may be hidden), making tradition in principle redundant.
Within its established limits, this is an excellent introduction to Confucian ethics, and the book has been extensively revised for this second edition. Even those wholly unfamiliar with this area will find the text entirely accessible. For those with some existing knowledge of the subject, Ivanhoe has some stimulating insights to offer. It is to be hoped that his book will lead to a well-merited increased interest in the two selected thinkers. I would, however, make two criticisms of the book’s style. There is, perhaps, rather more repetition than is necessary, and I cannot believe that a quarter of the book needs to be occupied by endnotes.
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