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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk      www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
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Ancient Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction
Julia Annas
2000 Oxford: OUP.
pp. 127 ISBN 0-19-285357-0 (pb) £5.99
Practical Philosophy (Book Reviews) Spring 2002 Volume 4.2
Reviewed by: Antonia Macaro
This is a deceptively small but rather condensed little book that will fit in your pocket and give you a flavour of ancient philosophy. It is that still rare animal, a jargon-free and accessible yet academically sound text. The arrangement of the material is unorthodox: instead of the usual chronological exposition by figures and schools, each chapter deals with a particular topic, explaining how Plato, Aristotle or the Hellenistic schools treated the issues involved. The chronological material is confined to a brief section in the introduction. Boxed sketches throughout the book expand on the material presented by either giving more historical background or more philosophical detail. The topics selected include reason and passion, happiness, knowledge and scepticism, logic and reality. Again unusually, however, the book engages in a discussion about modern interpretations of ancient texts and how our understanding of ancient ideas has developed through a constant interaction between those ideas themselves and subsequent theories and views.
The first two chapters are intended to exemplify the tension between those issues in ancient philosophy to which we can readily relate, and those that we can see only through a mist of historical interpretation. In the first chapter, questions are raised through the ‘case study’ of Medea, in relation to which both the Stoic view and the Platonic view are usefully and clearly contrasted. It is somewhat surprising, however, to find that Aristotle’s views are not mentioned other than in passing. The second chapter focuses on Plato’s Republic, and explores how the political reading of it developed in the nineteenth century and continued to the present day, although the assessment of it changed over time. In fact, Annas holds, the main question addressed by the book is ‘why should I be moral?’, and the ideal state is really a metaphor for the individual. In so doing she highlights the dangers of not realising that current philosophical interests shape our reading of texts.
The third chapter, on happiness, takes in hedonism and pleasure, short-term and long-term gratification, and virtue. Annas argues against the recent trend for translating arete as ‘excellence’, since this obscures the fact that the texts are about morality. She does not, however, explicitly address the question of how our ‘happiness’ relates to eudaimonia, although she does explain that ‘happiness’ in ancient philosophy does not have the subjective meaning that it has for us. It may have been useful, it would seem, to address terminological questions more directly. Chapters five and six are on knowledge and scepticism, and logic, physics and ethics. The last chapter covers the interesting topic of what it is that makes Greek and Hellenistic philosophy a unitary tradition, given that it includes such a variety of approaches and views; there are also short sections on what aspects of ancient philosophy were taken up by subsequent traditions, and on how ancient philosophy relates to other, especially Eastern, philosophical traditions.
This book will not answer all your questions on ancient philosophy, but it gives a good introduction on its crucial themes, raises interesting questions of interpretation, and is user-friendly and easy to read. It could be used profitably by philosophical counsellors and their clients alike.
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