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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk      www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
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The Siren and the Sage: knowledge and wisdom in ancient Greece and China
Steven Shankman and Stephen Durrant
2000. London: Cassell. pp. 257+x. ISBN 0-304-70640-X (pb) £18.99
Practical Philosophy (Book Reviews) March 2001 Volume 4.1
Reviewed by: Trevor Curnow
It is clear that there are differences between the thought of ancient China and the thought of ancient Greece, but precisely what those differences are is not so clear. This book attempts to articulate (some of) those differences in terms of the concepts of intentionality and participation. Intentionality is concerned with conceptualisation, objectification, and the creation of distance between ourselves and the world in which we live. It emphasises the disconnectedness of things, is associated with knowledge, and is represented by the siren. Participation is concerned with appreciation, engagement, and recognition of the fact that we are a part of the world we live in. It emphasises the interconnectedness of things, is associated with wisdom, and is represented by the sage. The nub of the argument is that whereas Chinese thought tended to participation, Greek thought tended to intentionality. Where Greek culture found the development of an assertive individualism exciting, the Chinese found it worrying. While the authors acknowledge the dangers inherent in making large scale generalisations of this kind (which I have generalised further here), their ideas provide useful promptings to guided reflection on Chinese and Greek thought (even if they sometimes play rather fast and loose with their pair of principal concepts).
The evidence for their argument is taken from three areas: poetry, history and philosophy. The three principal Greeks discussed are Homer, Thucydides and Plato. From the Chinese side come the authors of the Classic of Poetry and Records of the Historian, Confucius, Laozi, and a handful of others in small measure. I do not propose to discuss the poets or historians further, although some of my comments on Shankman and Durrant’s treatment of philosophy apply to them too.
The authors do not simply want to describe or characterise the natures of Greek and Chinese thought; they also want to go some way towards explaining them. This desire leads to the weakest sections of the book. Clearly, all thinkers work within specific contexts and, equally clearly, their thoughts have some connection with those contexts. However, the relationship between context and thought is a complex one and it is dangerous to assume otherwise, as the authors seem to. They compound this error with their bizarre decision to regard Plato as the first western philosopher. For Shankman and Durrant, Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War is the context from which philosophy, in the shape of Plato's thought, emerged. I find this claim absolutely incredible. The Presocratics are peremptorily brushed aside, and even Socrates barely gets a look in. The Greek world outside Athens is disregarded. (At this point it becomes difficult to take the book seriously.)
The authors push themselves into this untenable position partly on account of the comparative nature of their work. Because they want to set the emergence of Chinese philosophy in the context of the late Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods (when there was considerable political turmoil in China), they cast around for a parallel context in which to locate the development of philosophy in Greece. Sixth century BC Ionia is presumably far too peaceful, so the likes of Thales and Heraclitus are simply ignored!
In the end, then, the book is a very mixed bag. There are some genuinely stimulating insights and ideas, and some genuinely awful arguments. The comparative dimension of the book turns out to be both a strength and a weakness.
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