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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
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PHILOSOPHY PRACTICE an alternative to Counseling and Psychotherapy
Shlomit C. Schuster
1999 Westport and London: Praeger.
ISBN: 0-275-96541-4 (hb). 207 pages. £45.50.
Practical Philosophy (Book Reviews) March 2001 Volume 4.1
Reviewed by: Susan Elinor Wright
This book is explicitly intended to introduce the new profession of philosophical counselling[1] both to philosophers and to the wider public. Schuster also outlines other aspects of ‘philosophy practice’ such as Socratic Dialogue, and, more briefly, philosophy with business organisations, café philosophy and other ways of bringing philosophy to a more extensive community. A number of illuminating vignettes are included of material taken from the author’s own case studies.
Philosophical counselling aims at gaining insight into a client’s problems through a dialogue, focused on the clarification of ideas and beliefs, between client and counsellor. This focus makes the dialogue philosophical, even though the client may well not be knowledgeable in or about philosophy. Philosophical counselling is distinct from therapeutic counselling which usually focuses on the feelings and emotions of the client, and may be looking back into childhood for explanations of the present.
Implicitly, the book has another intention. Schuster is justifying, to others in this new profession, her own position within philosophical counselling. A meticulously detailed view of the professional scene in the late nineties is given. A variety of theorists are discussed, and controversies are carefully delineated. A discussion of ‘philosophy as practice’ is followed by a discussion of ‘philosophical care’, within which the author looks for the similarities and differences amongst various schools of philosophy, psychology, psychotherapy, and philosophical counselling in their conceptions of what is therapeutic or of what contributes to the care of clients.
Within the history of ‘western’ philosophy, Schuster traces a tradition, going back to Plato and the pre-Socratics, of philosophy as ‘care of the soul’. By the soul, she means all those aspects of a person that go beyond what is accessible to physical observation. This might or might not include specifically religious conceptions of the soul. Care, as well as inducing well-being, can be delivered via friendship, or via something very much akin to love.
Schuster is firmly committed to philosophy as a practice that can actually improve one’s life. She has an inclusive view of what can come under the concept of philosophy. For her, it can embrace not only an examination of concepts and clarification of beliefs but also the adoption of values and commitment to a way of life. She introduces the term ‘transtherapeutic’ for her own practice which she thinks, while not therapy, can induce well-being. Later, she uses the same term for philosophies with therapeutic effects, even if therapy was not a conscious intention of their proponents. Interestingly, although she puts forward philosophical counselling as an alternative to therapy, she does not come across as against therapy so much as against using a medical model and pathologising clients. She, and many of her clients, have had unproductive experiences with therapy and therapists, before coming to philosophical counselling. In spite of this, she freely and generously acknowledges the contributions that therapy can make to peoples’ well-being.
Schuster is always thoughtful in her presentation of her own and other people’s ideas. I was struck by the breadth of her reading, and, where I had knowledge of her material, by the depth of her insights. I do however have two reservations.
First, there seems to me to be an uneasy tension between Schuster’s aim of disseminating knowledge about philosophical counselling to wider audiences, and her implicit aim of justifying her own position. Her attention to detail would often be meaningful only to those who already know the scene, and might put off those who are new and seeking enlightenment. Similarly, in her discussions of philosophical care, so many theorists are mentioned that there is danger of overloading the reader. In both cases, it might have been clearer to have isolated a few broad, but central, themes.
Secondly, her very inclusiveness and openness bring her practice nearer to that of some therapeutic counsellors than she might want to admit. She certainly demonstrates that she has a philosophical and not a therapeutic focus, and that this brings insights. But however careful she is to distinguish philosophical counselling from therapeutic counselling, similarities emerge. Philosophical counselling is not exactly a talking cure, as psychotherapy is commonly held to be. Nonetheless, Schuster shows that the philosophical talking through of problems and anxieties can lead to alternative ways of thinking about them that do in fact alleviate the problems. In her accounts of her practice, she always accepts as valid the presentation given by the client. Even where she has a strong belief that a particular philosophical approach would help a client, she follows the client’s lead, and offers possible insights in a way that allows them to be accepted or rejected. She clearly shows Rogers’s core qualities of empathy, congruence and unconditional positive regard in all her dealings with clients, and seems to me to be thoroughly client-centred.
She perhaps is unaware that, in the UK at least, psychodynamic approaches to counselling have, in recent years, become much more client-centred. She is however, well aware, because she has taken part in them, that there have been discussions among philosophical counsellors, since this book was written, on what, if anything, is essential to their practice. It would perhaps be best to see this book as work in progress and as a contribution to an ongoing debate. As such, it is well worth reading.
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