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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk      www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
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Reason and Emotion: essays on ancient moral psychology and ethical theory
John M. Cooper
1999 Princeton: Princeton University Press.
pp xiv + 588. ISBN 0-691-05875-X (pb), £16.95.
Practical Philosophy (Book Reviews) July 2001 Volume 4.2
Reviewed by: Trevor Curnow
This is a weighty work in more ways than one. It is a hefty read, but fortunately it can be dipped into rather than scrupulously studied from cover to cover. Indeed, there is some advantage in taking the former approach since the book is not free from repetition. It is a collection of twenty-three essays written over a period of nearly thirty years. Most of them deal with the thought of Plato and Aristotle, with only three essays given over to Stoicism and Epicureanism.
Both the title and sub-title give an accurate indication of the book’s contents. Cooper's guiding and unifying theme is what might be termed the mechanics of morality as understood by some of the major thinkers of antiquity. (Morality is here understood in the ancient rather than the modern sense, with one’s whole life, rather than a peculiar set of problems within it, being understood as the object of ethical reflection.) Given that we are as we are (which is itself, of course, a matter of lively dispute), how do we manage to live a good life? Or perhaps the question is better put in a more negative way: how do we so frequently fail to live a good life? The central importance of reason is acknowledged by all of the thinkers discussed here, although Cooper brings out the different views they had concerning precisely what reason was, and, in particular, the degree to which it exercised control over the domain of action. Some accord a stronger motivational force to reason than others, and so are led to different positions on the question as to whether the failure to live a good life is a failure of reason as such.
Where reason is held to have serious motivational competition, it is the emotions that are seen to provide the required alternative influence. Again, Cooper effectively explores the different ways in which the emotions were understood by the philosophical schools, and the directions in which those different understandings developed. What emerges is an interesting array of attempted explanations of the observed, and experienced, facts. While modern philosophers perhaps tend to be too readily dismissive of any psychology which is not equally modern, Cooper is always keen to give credit where it is due. Implicitly, at least, there is often the sense that the models developed by the ancient philosophers are not lacking in insights that might benefit contemporary ones.
The book will undoubtedly be of most interest to students of the moral and political philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, of which there is no shortage. One of the book’s strengths is its engagement with topics, such as Aristotle’s treatment of friendship, which are too frequently neglected. Indeed, a study of the relevant essays cannot fail to broaden anyone’s understanding of Aristotle’s Nicomachaean Ethics generally (although I would question the helpfulness of Cooper’s decision to use ‘virtue’ as an equivalent to arete). To the extent to which people find such classic texts of contemporary relevance, so they will also appreciate the practical value of Cooper’s commentaries on them.
However, for those whose interests lie more in the areas of moral psychology and motivation, there are also benefits to be had. For such readers the book constitutes an introduction and guide to how some of the wisest minds of the western world wrestled with problems of persistent concern. Even if their attempts are adjudged to be unsuccessful, the ways in which they failed may yet be instructive. If only we were all equipped to make such impressive mistakes!
Trevor Curnow
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