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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
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PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHYTHE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICEwww.practical-philosophy.org.uk www.society-for-philosophy-in-practice.org |
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Intellectual Impostures
Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont
1999 (second edition). London: Profile Books
Practical Philosophy (Book Reviews) November 2000 Volume 3.3
Reviewed by: Trevor Curnow
Every new philosophical movement is a divisive force. There is nothing novel about that. Many new philosophical movements are characterised by their opponents as meaningless or vacuous, while being hailed by their adherents as rescuing philosophy from oblivion. There is nothing novel about that either. Seen in those terms, postmodernism is just the latest in a long line of philosophical developments, and one whose true significance probably cannot yet be properly assessed. However, if it is too soon for final verdicts, it is not too soon for some interim judgements.
Sokal and Bricmont's book is an important one, and an important one to review. It has gained a widespread popular reputation, but that reputation can be misleading. It is often talked about as if it were a thoroughgoing debunking of postmodernism as such. It is not. Its target is a much more limited one. The authors' aim is to reveal the abuse of scientific terms and language by a selection of writers who can reasonably be termed postmodernist. That abuse is claimed to be such as to render portions of their writings literally meaningless. Those accused here are Lacan, Kristeva, Irigaray, Latour, Baudrillard, Deleuze, Guattari and Virilio. The specific charge (put on p. 13) is this: ‘The authors quoted in this book clearly do not have more than the vaguest understanding of the scientific concepts they invoke and, most importantly, they fail to give any argument justifying the relevance of these scientific concepts to the subjects allegedly under study. They are engaged in name-dropping, not just faulty reasoning.’
There is nothing new in decrying standards of academic writing. It often seems to be an exercise in obscuration. And when, despite the best efforts of the author, its meaning is revealed, it often delivers far less than it seemed to promise. Here, however, the claim is that behind the postmodernist veil of obscurity there may sometimes be nothing at all. The most recent emperor on the philosophical block is more scantily clad than he would wish us to believe.
Because it does not (and does not seek to) challenge any of the tenets of postmodernism itself, this book is more a work of entertainment than one of philosophy. However, it is an entertainment with a serious purpose. After reading this, anyone tempted to slip the odd 'quantum' or 'chaos' into their writings should at least pause for second thoughts before doing so. More broadly, the book can be seen as a call for clarity in academic writing, and a demonstration of what may happen when it is neglected. Finally, it must also serve as a source of concern to postmodernists that so many of their leading figures have been revealed as (at least occasional) pedlars of gibberish.
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