Report of Fourth International Conference on Philosophical
Practice
Trevor Curnow
The Fourth International Conference on Philosophical Practice
took place in Bensberg, Germany, from August 3rd to 7th. Present were over 170
people from around 20 different countries, including Anne Noble, Karin Murris,
Simon du Plock and Trevor Curnow from the UK. Simon and Karin not only attended
but also offered workshops. The theme of the conference was ‘Reflections on
the role of the virtues in the life of the individual’.
The conference began with a lecture by Gerd Achenbach, during
which he emphasised the need for philosophical counsellors to lead model lives
and practise what they preach. It ended with a lecture by Lou Marinoff in which
he took the opportunity to publicly lay into his opponents in uncompromising
terms, to the bafflement of many and the dismay (or worse) of most. In between,
there seemed to be almost as many views of philosophical practice flying around
as there were people present. Presentations were divided between lectures and
workshops, often in parallel sessions. Many ‘workshops’, however, turned out
to be little more than shorter lectures. The tendency was for lectures to offer
no time for questions or discussion, and workshops to offer some, although not
always very much. Unfortunately, when there was time for them, ‘questions’ often
turned out themselves to be mini-lectures. As a consequence, most discussions
of any value took place outside of the formal programme, often in the context
of shared experiences of food, caffeine, nicotine or alcohol.
Lectures and workshops tended to polarise between those which
took the notion of virtue seriously as a topic, and those which simply mentioned
it in passing. Some who attended in expectation of a conference which would
address itself centrally to the virtues expressed a degree of disappointment
because of this. When the virtues were explicitly considered, ancient philosophers
featured far more conspicuously than modern ones. Plato, but more particularly
Aristotle and the Stoics, were well to the fore. On the other hand, they were
frequently discussed with reference to their modern apologists. The names of
Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault were probably those which featured most often.
Where the focus was more on philosophical counselling, some
put forward a particular line, while others sought to make sense of the variety
of existing approaches. What emerged from at least one discussion was that the
nature of philosophy itself is a serious bone of contention. This being so,
substantial differences of opinion as to what philosophical counsellors are
seeking to offer can scarcely be wondered at. To some, these differences suggested
richness and flexibility, to others chaos and incoherence.
What emerged for me from the conference was a sense of a fundamental
tension. In order to be credible (and payable) as a profession, some clearly
feel that differences need to be buried, if they cannot be resolved, such that
philosophical counsellors can form themselves into an organised and recognised
body of practitioners. On the other hand, some equally clearly feel either that
such a move is not necessary, or, if it is, that the price being demanded in
terms of the sacrifice of personal (and philosophical) integrity is not worth
paying. Ultimately, and fittingly in the context of this conference, the tension
seems to be between professional practice and personal virtue. The fact that
this and other tensions were so clearly not resolved at Bensberg means that
the question needs to be asked, in echo of Gerd Achenbach’s opening lecture,
as to what extent philosophical practitioners can plausibly claim to be able
to resolve the problems of others if they cannot do the same for their own.
No mean question.