PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE SOCIETY FOR PHILOSOPHY IN PRACTICE

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Report of Fourth International Conference on Philosophical Practice

Trevor Curnow

The Fourth International Conference on Philosophical Practice took place in Bensberg, Germany, from August 3rd to 7th. Present were over 170 people from around 20 different countries, including Anne Noble, Karin Murris, Simon du Plock and Trevor Curnow from the UK. Simon and Karin not only attended but also offered workshops. The theme of the conference was ‘Reflections on the role of the virtues in the life of the individual’.

The conference began with a lecture by Gerd Achenbach, during which he emphasised the need for philosophical counsellors to lead model lives and practise what they preach. It ended with a lecture by Lou Marinoff in which he took the opportunity to publicly lay into his opponents in uncompromising terms, to the bafflement of many and the dismay (or worse) of most. In between, there seemed to be almost as many views of philosophical practice flying around as there were people present. Presentations were divided between lectures and workshops, often in parallel sessions. Many ‘workshops’, however, turned out to be little more than shorter lectures. The tendency was for lectures to offer no time for questions or discussion, and workshops to offer some, although not always very much. Unfortunately, when there was time for them, ‘questions’ often turned out themselves to be mini-lectures. As a consequence, most discussions of any value took place outside of the formal programme, often in the context of shared experiences of food, caffeine, nicotine or alcohol.

Lectures and workshops tended to polarise between those which took the notion of virtue seriously as a topic, and those which simply mentioned it in passing. Some who attended in expectation of a conference which would address itself centrally to the virtues expressed a degree of disappointment because of this. When the virtues were explicitly considered, ancient philosophers featured far more conspicuously than modern ones. Plato, but more particularly Aristotle and the Stoics, were well to the fore. On the other hand, they were frequently discussed with reference to their modern apologists. The names of Pierre Hadot and Michel Foucault were probably those which featured most often.

Where the focus was more on philosophical counselling, some put forward a particular line, while others sought to make sense of the variety of existing approaches. What emerged from at least one discussion was that the nature of philosophy itself is a serious bone of contention. This being so, substantial differences of opinion as to what philosophical counsellors are seeking to offer can scarcely be wondered at. To some, these differences suggested richness and flexibility, to others chaos and incoherence.

What emerged for me from the conference was a sense of a fundamental tension. In order to be credible (and payable) as a profession, some clearly feel that differences need to be buried, if they cannot be resolved, such that philosophical counsellors can form themselves into an organised and recognised body of practitioners. On the other hand, some equally clearly feel either that such a move is not necessary, or, if it is, that the price being demanded in terms of the sacrifice of personal (and philosophical) integrity is not worth paying. Ultimately, and fittingly in the context of this conference, the tension seems to be between professional practice and personal virtue. The fact that this and other tensions were so clearly not resolved at Bensberg means that the question needs to be asked, in echo of Gerd Achenbach’s opening lecture, as to what extent philosophical practitioners can plausibly claim to be able to resolve the problems of others if they cannot do the same for their own. No mean question.



PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

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